

SECRET

*File*

27 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/NE

FROM: CEB

SUBJECT: Some Problems in the Coordination of Memoranda

1. It has been the practice for some time to attach to intelligence memoranda prepared for circulation outside the Agency a footnote indicating whether they have been prepared entirely within CIA, indicating the Agency element principally responsible, and naming those other elements that participated or gave their concurrence. The origin of this practice was a request from General Maxwell Taylor that he not be given papers without clear indication of their origin. In practice, the sourcing footnote has provided a means of assuring and certifying coordination of memoranda within the Agency.

2. By common consent responsibility for coordination of memoranda has been left to the people engaged in their preparation. In ONE responsibility for giving concurrence when consulted has been left to the Staff Chiefs, who have the authority to delegate that responsibility to staff members. Notification is given in writing to the CEB's office of all concurrences requested and of the action taken, but nothing further is required unless there is a problem that cannot be resolved at the working level. Other offices follow similar procedures. It has been the general practice to coordinate and ask concurrence only of those Agency elements whose consent is regarded as pertinent to the matter at hand. ONE, for example, does not ask DDC&T concurrence on a memorandum on a political or economic subject, nor does it ask that of OCI or OER on a subject deemed largely military. Other offices publish without consulting ONE when they write on matters of a current or technical nature, for example, on which it is considered that ONE's views are not pertinent.

3. In general these procedures have worked very well. They depend for their effectiveness on the exercise of good judgment by the

SECRET

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**SECRET**

analysts with respect to the interests, resources, and claims to be consulted of the many elements in the Agency engaged in preparing finished intelligence. It also depends on the manner in which they interpret and represent the views of their own offices in giving or withholding concurrence in memoranda prepared by others.

4. The present system depends on the assumption that analysts, checked by their supervisors and office chiefs, have the authority to decide which of the various Agency components should be consulted and which not. In the past when memoranda have been given external circulation without ONE concurrence and when ONE has believed that it should have been consulted, the matter has been brought to the attention of the Office chief concerned. The discussions which followed have demonstrated that they have a mutual interest in seeing that the system works. Problems usually arise when an analyst is pressed for time and hopes to avoid or shortcut consultation which he fears will delay publication or change his memorandum. His supervisor or Office chief is usually more concerned than he about maintaining good relations with other Agency components.

5. There are, however, more difficult problems than that of seeing that consultation actually takes place. First, there is the problem of what to do in the case of a clear divergence of views on a matter of judgment. It is essential, of course, that the Agency speak to the outside world with a single voice. There is a general willingness to tolerate treatments of subjects that would not be the preference of the party asked to give concurrence, so long as basic judgments are in agreement. Most analysts are willing to go quite far in accommodating other components of the Agency in order to get a paper that can be put out with all proper concurrences. I do not know of a paper which has been withheld from publication because of the withholding of concurrence. There was one case, of course, in which ONE found itself unable to subscribe to the formulation of the problem and the methodology employed. Because this was a paper written in response to a special request, it was agreed that in this case ONE's name could simply be left out of the sourcing footnote. In a case of substantive difference such a solution would be unlikely to satisfy. I suggest that each case should be decided on its merits and that in most instances a solution will be found by working the alternative arguments into the text or appending a footnote in which they are spelled out.

- 2 -

**SECRET**

ILLEGIB

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010018-9

SECRET

6. Another kind of problem arises over the question of what offices should be consulted on any given paper. In most cases the choice is obvious. In some it can be a very difficult and delicate matter. I do not believe there is any rule of thumb, nor do I believe that a rule can be formulated, however complicated, that will cover all cases. Each component of the Agency has an obvious claim to be consulted on a paper that covers a field in which it has special competence and responsibility. ONS's rights are perhaps more difficult to define than those of any other Agency component. It can claim the right to be consulted on any broad and important matter on which estimates are made. But where do you draw the line between these and subjects that are essentially specific, current, or technical? Here again the only practical rule is for the analysts, under the direction of their supervisors, to be held responsible to the claims of other Offices and components of the Agency. Each misjudgment noted should lead to discussion and, hopefully, corrective action. It should be kept in mind that there have in practice been very few cases where one component has felt that it had a valid complaint against another.

25X1 7. There remains one area in which ONS has a clear and easily established claim to being consulted and listened to. I refer to memoranda which deal with estimates made in National Intelligence Estimates, or which are due to be treated in forthcoming NIEs. Your treatment of this whole issue in your Memorandum to the Director of the Office of Strategic Research (Ref. CIA Memorandum on the [redacted] dated 10 October 1967) sets forth ONS's position on this matter. I believe it should be sent to all components of the Agency that produce finished intelligence.

8. I have discussed the subject of this memorandum with a variety of people whose judgment I value and have found general agreement with the outline of the present system as set forth above and with the principles that analysts should be held responsible for deciding who should be asked for concurrence and seeing that it is done, and that the system is best policed by having aggrieved parties take their case to the superiors of the analyst with whose decisions they disagree. One proposal for change in the system is being considered by the AONI. It is to footnote memoranda published for circulation outside the Agency simply with the statement that they have been prepared entirely within the Agency, or in collaboration with some

- 3 -

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010018-9

SECRET

*from* → other agency when that is the case. (This would deprive the outside reader of nothing, inasmuch as he is unlikely to know one CIA component as the other. It would have the advantage of avoiding the situation in which an OMB Special Memorandum or an OMB concurrence could be read as a modification of an estimate made in an EIR or SHIB.) Those copies of the memorandum circulated within the Agency, however, would carry a slip indicating the office of preparation, other offices participating, and offices concurring. (This would permit the present system of policing the concurrence system to continue as at present.) I recommend that we support the AHD in this proposal.

25X1

*Do we seek clarification and agreement on rules of procedure?*

- 4 -

SECRET